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ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Saul P. Morgenstern, Jennifer B. Patterson & Terri A. Mazur*
INTRODUCTION
Although the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately defines the standards by
which marketplace conduct is to be judged under the antitrust laws, and
other circuit and district courts make significant contributions to the law’s
development, there is no question that the Second Circuit and the district
courts within it often have led the way in developing the nation’s antitrust
jurisprudence. Routinely cited, the Second Circuit’s decisions have often
broken new analytical ground and either set the standard by which other
courts judge similar questions or set the table for resolution by the Supreme
Court.
A running thread through Second Circuit antitrust jurisprudence is a
willingness to examine market participants’ real-world conduct and the
consequences of that conduct in seeking out the balance between
incentivizing robust competition and protecting the market—and ultimately
consumers—from distortions caused by anticompetitive conduct. Thus, the
Second Circuit has arguably led the way in defining how we determine
whether a monopoly violates the law and what constraints apply to the
conduct of one who holds a lawfully acquired monopoly.
Similarly, the circuit has laid the groundwork for national adoption of a
damages analysis for violations of the Robinson-Patman Act that
recognized the difference between the harm Congress sought to remedy by
that law and the harm caused by conspiracy and monopolization under
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. In other areas, the court has provided
important input into the national conversation about areas of antitrust law in
* Saul P. Morgenstern chairs the Antitrust Practice Group at the New York law firm Kaye
Scholer LLP and is a member of the Bars of the Second Circuit and the State of New York;
he is a graduate of Boston University and Hofstra University School of Law. Jennifer B.
Patterson is a partner at Kaye Scholer LLP and a member of the Bars of the State of New
York and the State of Connecticut; she is a graduate of Vanderbilt University, Georgetown
University Law Center, and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service graduate
program at Georgetown University. Terri A. Mazur is a member of the Bars of the Second
Circuit and the State of New York; she is a graduate of Cornell University and Northwestern
University School of Law. The authors would like to thank Kaye Scholer Associates Alice
C.C. Huling, a member of the Bars of the Second Circuit and the State of New York, and
Cara Spencer, a member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and Maryland, and Summer
Associates Erin Iannotti and Maurica John for their valuable contributions to this Article.
The authors would also like to thank Anne Reddy of the New York Bar for her assistance in
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the wake of Supreme Court decisions that changed the direction of the law,
helping to fill in the blanks left by those decisions.
This Article collects and describes rulings that, in the authors’ view,
reflect these themes in Second Circuit antitrust jurisprudence. The court’s
long history in this substantive space, its likely continued exposure to
critical antitrust questions, and the importance of this area of the law to our
national economy assure that others will be examining and shedding further
light on the Second Circuit’s important work in antitrust well into the
future.
I. MONOPOLIZATION
The extent of the Second Circuit’s influence is no more apparent than in
cases of alleged monopolization. The words of the Sherman Act paint
broad strokes, leaving to the courts the task of applying its guidance to the
real world of commerce and markets. Section 2 of the Sherman Act is no
exception, stating that it is unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize” trade or commerce.1 While the statute could be read to outlaw
any monopoly, it did not take long for courts to realize that such a broad
prohibition might cause more harm than good. Such prohibition could
deprive businesses from attracting customers by rewarding their loyalty
with good value, thereby removing an important incentive essential to
robust competition. This inherent ambiguity left it to the courts to navigate
the tension between preventing the unlawful acquisition of monopoly power
and allowing monopolies formed through honest competition to exist and
even to thrive. The Second Circuit jumped into that issue in United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America2 (Alcoa) and Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co.,3 two opinions that have shaped this country’s approach to
monopolization in antitrust enforcement nationwide and laid the
groundwork for later decisions on the boundaries imposed on what the
owners of lawfully acquired monopolies may do.
A. Establishing a Framework
for Considering Monopolization Cases: Alcoa
Judge Learned Hand’s 1945 opinion for the court in Alcoa serves as the
basis for analysis of alleged section 2 violations of the Sherman Act. In that
case, the Second Circuit had to decide whether Aluminum Company of
America (“Alcoa”) had monopolized the virgin aluminum ingot market—of
which it controlled more than 90 percent—in violation of section 2.4 The
case came before the Second Circuit after the trial court ruled that Alcoa
had not monopolized the market.5 Judge Hand examined the distinction
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 423.
Id. at 436.
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between acquiring a monopoly by competing successfully and acquiring a
monopoly unlawfully.6
First, the court had to determine whether Alcoa was a monopoly by
considering the company’s size and control within the marketplace.7 The
Alcoa opinion articulated a framework by which courts should consider
whether a monopoly exists—a rubric that remains the standard today.
Under this framework, courts must determine the relevant market in which
the alleged monopolist operates and then assess the alleged monopolist’s
power within that defined market. Accordingly, different definitions of the
relevant market could yield different conclusions regarding the existence of
a monopoly.8 In Alcoa, if the market included only virgin aluminum ingot
sold in the United States, purchasers would have little choice but to buy
from Alcoa because the company had more than a 90 percent market share.9
If secondary aluminum ingot—aluminum salvaged from initial usage and
repurposed—could be substituted for virgin aluminum, and therefore
included in the relevant market, Alcoa’s share would have fallen to 64
percent.10 Finally, if the part of Alcoa’s ingot production that it fabricated
into products—and therefore did not sell as ingot—were excluded from the
market, then Alcoa’s share would have fallen to about 33 percent.11
Judge Hand defined the relevant market as the total amount of virgin
aluminum ingot available for sale in the United States, excluding secondary
aluminum ingot and including Alcoa’s captive sales, which resulted in a
market share in the relevant market of more than 90 percent.12 The Alcoa
decision set the standard for monopolization cases; courts must define the
relevant market in order to determine the market power of a potential
monopolist.13 Judge Hand reasoned that controlling 90 percent of the
market allowed Alcoa to control prices within the market14 and thus found
that Alcoa had sufficient market power to be a monopolist.
The opinion also set some broad guideposts as to what would, and would
not, be sufficient market share to create risk of a monopoly, stating that “it
is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough [market
share to constitute a monopoly]; and certainly thirty-three per cent is not.”15
Judge Hand did not articulate the reasoning behind these guideposts, nor
did he identify a threshold market share amount that would indicate a
monopoly. Nevertheless, the Alcoa decision created an unprecedented
framework for assessing whether a monopoly exists—a framework that
remains the starting point in assessing monopolization claims. To this day,
U.S. antitrust jurisprudence includes no fixed definition of how much
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 429.
See id. at 429–30.
Id. at 424–25.
Id. at 425.
See id. at 424.
Id.
Id. at 425.
See id. at 422–32.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 424.
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market share indicates monopoly. Monopoly power is defined by Alcoa’s
rule: whether a company has the power to control prices and exclude
competition.
The Alcoa decision is also notable for its discussion of the circumstances
under which a monopolist is guilty of monopolization under section 2 of the
Sherman Act, cementing the distinction between merely being a monopolist
and having “monopolized” unlawfully in violation of section 2. Judge
Hand noted that Alcoa “may not have achieved monopoly; monopoly may
have been thrust upon it.”16 In particular, Judge Hand’s opinion argued
against a reading of section 2 of the Sherman Act that would create a
blanket prohibition of monopolies, identifying three scenarios in which a
monopoly was “thrust upon” a company, rather than obtained through
unlawful monopolizing activity by the company: First, a “natural
monopoly,” when the nature of the industry only supports one seller.
Second, when changes to taste or cost drive a seller’s competition out of the
market. Third, when a seller becomes a monopoly by virtue of being the
most successful competitor in a given market.17 In discussing this third
scenario, Judge Hand noted that
a strong argument can be made that, although the result may expose the
public to the evils of monopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn the
resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis
opus coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged to compete,
must not be turned upon when he wins.18

In considering whether a monopoly had been “thrust upon” Alcoa, Judge
Hand reasoned that a company is not guilty of monopolization when it is
but a “passive beneficiary of a monopoly.”19 Judge Hand determined that
Alcoa had not been a passive beneficiary because it had actively pursued its
monopoly status by “progressively [embracing] each new opportunity as it
opened” and thereby “fac[ing] every newcomer with new capacity already
geared into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade
connections and the elite of personnel.”20 Thus, Judge Hand found Alcoa
to have engaged in monopolization and thereby to have violated section 2
of the Sherman Act.21
Judge Hand’s application of the principles he articulated to Alcoa
arguably crossed the line he had drawn and created a per se rule prohibiting
dominant firms within a market from using the benefit of their size and skill
to compete in that market, even if their dominance has been won by fair and
effective competition. As some critics have noted, “after Alcoa, the
successful competitor may indeed be ‘turned upon’ because he may not

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 429 (emphases added).
See id. at 429–30.
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id. at 431.
See id.
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compete.”22 For that reason, the application of the principle to the specific
facts in Alcoa has been revisited over time. However, Judge Hand’s
principle lives on—courts recognize that one can lawfully acquire
monopoly power and that monopoly power is not an unfair reward for
successful competition. As a result, Judge Hand’s distinction between
merely being a monopolist and unlawfully monopolizing under section 2 of
the Sherman Act has been broadly cited by monopolization decisions issued
throughout the country over many decades.
B. The Next Phase in Determining a Test
for Unlawful Monopolization: Berkey
Alcoa generally went unchallenged across circuits until 1979, when the
Second Circuit issued its historic antitrust opinion in Berkey, written by
then-Chief Judge Kaufman.23 Kodak was a fully integrated manufacturer of
cameras, light-sensitive film, photographic paper on which the film could
be printed, and the various processing chemicals used to develop film and
paper.24 Kodak was a leader in the industry and regularly introduced new
products, including new types of amateur cameras and films, often in new
sizes.25 Berkey was a much smaller competitor in those markets and
complained that Kodak’s introduction of new products without warning
allowed Kodak to thwart competition by preventing others from offering
competing products on a timely basis.
It was uncontested in Berkey that Kodak had a monopoly in the sale of
However, Berkey presented an
cameras, film, and color paper.26
opportunity for the court to revisit the issue of when a monopoly is lawfully
acquired and thus address whether and how section 2 of the Sherman Act
limited a dominant company’s ability to compete. The Berkey Court began
by abandoning Alcoa’s arguably narrow view of when a monopoly is
lawfully acquired, stating that “[a]s an operative rule of law . . . the ‘thrust
upon’ phrase does not suffice.”27 Instead, based on a comprehensive
analysis of previous case law discussing the facets of section 2 of the

22. Edward D. Cavanagh, Antitrust in the Second Circuit, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 795,
799 (1991).
23. Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
24. Before the invention of digital cameras, which capture photographs on a built-in
sensor, photographers relied on plastic film coated with chemicals that, when exposed to
light, recorded images that became visible (in negative image) when treated with other
chemicals. Those images could be projected onto similarly coated paper, which could then
be treated to develop the image as it appeared in the real world (i.e., the opposite of the
negative image on the film). Thus, to take photographs, a photographer needed a camera and
film, and someone (either the photographer or a photofinishing lab) had to develop the film
and print paper photographs to finish the process. Kodak made and sold all of the necessary
products and offered photofinishing services to amateurs who could not, or did not want to,
do it themselves after taking pictures.
25. See Berkey, 603 F.2d at 269.
26. Id. at 269–71.
27. Id. at 274.
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Sherman Act, the court recognized that even a monopolist should be
permitted to compete and not be limited to succeeding by accident.28
As a preliminary matter, the Berkey Court adopted the Supreme Court’s
rule in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.29 that the first step
in analyzing a section 2 claim is to define the relevant market.30 Consistent
with Judge Hand’s approach in Alcoa, the du Pont Court’s analysis of
whether a monopoly existed began with the Court’s determination of the
appropriate market. The Berkey Court similarly adopted the Supreme
Court’s 1966 pronouncement in United States v. Grinnell Corp.31 that “after
monopoly . . . power is found, the second element of the [section] 2 offense
is ‘the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.’”32 Grinnell’s articulation of the
section 2 offense was, of course, a slightly different way of stating the
principle Judge Hand articulated in Alcoa—a monopoly won by competing
effectively is not unlawful.33 Expanding on the jurisprudence of Alcoa and
Grinnell, the Berkey Court then went a step further, holding that “the law’s
hostility to monopoly power extends beyond the means of its acquisition.
Even if that power has been legitimately acquired, the monopolist may not
wield it to prevent or impede competition.”34 The Second Circuit in Berkey
thus articulated a gloss on the Alcoa-Grinnell principle. While a lawful
monopolist was free to reap the benefits of success, it could not use its
monopoly power to entrench itself:
The mere possession of monopoly power does not ipso facto condemn a
market participant. But, to avoid the proscriptions of [section] 2, the firm
must refrain at all times from conduct directed at smothering competition.
This doctrine has two branches. Unlawfully acquired power remains
anathema even when kept dormant. And it is no less true that a firm with
legitimately achieved monopoly may not wield the resulting power to
tighten its hold on the market.35

Having stated that broad principle, the Berkey Court examined whether
Kodak’s monopoly position obliged it to disclose its new product
developments in the camera and film industries to competitors like Berkey
in advance, enabling them to introduce compatible products when Kodak
did, rather than forcing competitors to play catch up.36 The court
determined that Kodak was not obligated to do so.37 The Berkey Court
noted that withholding advance knowledge of one’s new products and
28. Id. at 274–75.
29. 351 U.S. 377 (1956). In du Pont, the dissenting opinion identifies Judge Hand’s
Alcoa decision as a “landmark section 2 case.” Id. at 424 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
30. See Berkey, 603 F.2d at 268–69 (citing du Pont, 351 U.S. at 391–93).
31. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
32. Berkey, 603 F.2d at 274 (quoting Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71).
33. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 275.
36. See id. at 279–85.
37. Id. at 284.
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advancements is typically valid competitive conduct.38 The court observed
that “a monopolist is permitted, and indeed encouraged, by [section] 2 to
compete aggressively on the merits, any success that it may achieve through
‘the process of invention and innovation’ is clearly tolerated by the antitrust
laws.”39 Thus, the Berkey Court declined to require monopolists to help
smaller firms, making it clear that lawfully acquired monopolies are entitled
to the benefits of their dominant market share.
The Berkey Court did, however, recognize limits to using lawfully
acquired power in one market to acquire dominance in other markets.
Stating that “[i]t is clear that a firm may not employ its market position as a
lever to create—or attempt to create—a monopoly in another market,” the
Berkey Court examined whether Kodak had leveraged its monopoly power
in the film and camera markets to gain illicit advantages in the
photofinishing equipment market, where Kodak was not a monopolist.40
The Berkey Court determined that Kodak did not gain competitive
advantage in the photofinishing market when it introduced Kodacolor II
film, which required a new photofinishing process, along with its 110
camera.41 Further, the Berkey Court clarified that, because Kodak was an
integrated firm, the advantages the company gained from selling equipment
required for the new photofinishing process used in its new film and camera
did not constitute monopolization.42
The Berkey decision clarified many important principles within the law
of monopolization. It established that a monopolist may compete
vigorously on the merits with smaller rivals and may capitalize on
economies of scale resulting from its larger size.43 This was a shift from
earlier thinking, as seen in Alcoa, that a monopoly had to exercise special
restraint.44 Instead, the Berkey decision employed competition laws to
promote economic efficiency rather than to shield inefficient competitors.
However, while a monopolist may exploit efficiencies arising from its
integration in multiple markets, the Second Circuit made clear that there
was a limit: a monopolist may not use its monopoly power to block
competition or to grow its power in other markets in which it does not have
monopoly power. Because it found for Kodak on the facts, the Berkey
Court did not have the opportunity to articulate where that limit lies.45 That
task was left to later cases, many of which—including those in other
circuits—to this day still start their analysis where Berkey left off.46

38. Id. at 281.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 275 (citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); SmithKline Corp. v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978)).
41. Id. at 281.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 423 (2d Cir. 1945).
45. Cavanagh, supra note 22, at 807.
46. See, e.g., Catlin v. Wash. Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986).
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C. Regulating the Behavior of a Monopolist:
What Constitutes Illicit Monopolization?
Since Alcoa and Berkey, the Second Circuit has, on several occasions,
had the opportunity to define the lawful limits on what lawful monopolists
may do to “protect their turf.”
1. Predatory Pricing
In 1981, in Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co.47 (AT&T), Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit applied the
rationale of Berkey to consider the difference between “engag[ing] in
vigorous competition” and “subvert[ing] the competitive process by unfair
or unreasonable means.”48 In AT&T, the plaintiff, Northeastern Telephone
Company, a relatively small supplier of telephone equipment, alleged that
the defendants AT&T and its affiliates serving the Connecticut area were
selling their public branch exchanges (PBX) and key telephones below cost,
and that the two-tier pricing schemes that the defendants were offering to
certain business customers were anticompetitive.49 The Second Circuit
considered whether such activities constituted “predatory pricing,” which it
defined as “the deliberate sacrifice of present revenues for the purpose of
driving rivals out of the market and then recouping the losses through
higher profits earned in the absence of competition.”50 The court
acknowledged that “[p]redatory pricing is difficult to distinguish from
vigorous price competition” and is likely rare.51 The court also expressed
concern that “[i]nadvertently condemning [price] competition as an instance
of predation [would] undoubtedly chill the very behavior the antitrust laws
seek to promote.”52 Thus, in AT&T, the court found that, while predatory
pricing was certainly anticompetitive, “the rarity of the phenomenon” must
inform a court’s definition of such activity.53
Balancing these considerations, the Second Circuit shied away from
creating a complex analysis for determining predatory pricing.54 Instead,
the court endorsed a bright-line rule directing courts to compare a firm’s
marginal costs to the prices it charges to determine whether those prices are
predatory.55 If average or typical marginal costs exceed prices, those prices
If not, they are presumptively
are presumptively predatory.56
competitive.57

47. 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981).
48. Id. at 79.
49. See id. at 81.
50. Id. at 86 (quoting Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975)).
51. Id. at 88.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Applying this newly articulated test for determining whether the
defendants had engaged in predatory pricing, the court in AT&T found no
showing that the defendants’ conduct was beyond the bounds of
competitive propriety as laid out in Berkey, noting that the record contained
no evidence that the defendants had priced below marginal cost.58 The
court noted, however, that pricing schemes similar to those of the AT&T
defendants might be predatory if a plaintiff could show that a defendant
omitted direct costs, the inclusion of which would cause marginal cost to
exceed price.59 The court rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that average or
fully distributed costs should be considered.60 Throughout its AT&T
decision, the Second Circuit tied the determination of predatory pricing to
marginal cost, a crucial step in the development of the law in this area.61
2. “Product Hopping”
A patent is effectively a limited-duration lawful monopoly over the
market for the patented invention. When a patent is close to expiring, some
companies seek to preserve their market position by inducing customers to
transition to a new product, or new version of the product that is protected
by a longer-term patent. Recently, in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v.
Actavis PLC,62 the Second Circuit became the first circuit to explore when
“product improvement” crosses the line into “product hopping” in violation
of section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act.63 For years, Actavis had marketed
Namenda IR, a treatment for Alzheimer’s disease taken twice a day.64 As
the patent term for Namenda IR was coming to an end, Actavis introduced
Namenda XR, a formulation that could be taken once daily—an
improvement in the eyes of some.65 Namenda XR enjoys patent protection
through 2029.66
Typically, when a pharmaceutical patent term expires, generic
manufacturers enter the market, and pharmacists are either permitted or
required to fill prescriptions with lower-cost generic versions of the
originally patented drug.67 Thus, patients taking Namenda IR after July
2015 would, in many instances, receive a less-expensive generic version if
one were introduced. However, for regulatory reasons, pharmacies would

58. Id. at 90–91.
59. Id. at 91.
60. Id. at 89–90.
61. The Second Circuit’s AT&T decision has been discussed with approval by other
circuits addressing similar questions regarding predatory pricing. See, e.g., United States. v.
AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
62. 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015).
63. Id. at 643 n.2. An appeal on product hopping claims has recently been filed in the
Third Circuit. See Mylan Pharm. Inc., v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 WL
1736957 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-2236 (3d Cir. May 20, 2015).
64. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 646.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 647.
67. Id. at 645 & n.7.
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not be permitted to substitute a generic version of Namenda IR for a
Namenda XR prescription.68
As the patent term on Namenda IR was close to expiring, Actavis used
both “soft-switch” and “hard-switch” strategies to transition Namenda IR
patients to Namenda XR.69 Its soft-switch strategies included marketing
Namenda XR aggressively to doctors and patients and selling it at a
discount.70 Its hard-switch strategy was to take Namenda IR off the market
near the end of its patent term, before generics could enter the market,
forcing patients who wanted continuity of treatment to switch to Namenda
XR, and to provide Namenda IR only through a mail order pharmacy—but
only where continued treatment was “medically necessary.”71 New York
State sought a preliminary injunction against the hard-switch strategy,
which the trial court granted.72
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge John Walker, affirmed the
preliminary injunction, analyzing Actavis’s conduct under Berkey, which
held that a monopolist’s introduction of a new product is not
anticompetitive unless it compels consumers to purchase the new product.73
In the Second Circuit’s view, Actavis’s hard-switch strategy crossed this
line.74 Although the court did not explicitly rule on this issue, its reasoning
implicitly endorsed the soft-switch strategy.75 Because evidence that
Actavis sought to force the market to switch to the new product before
generic substitution could occur made it substantially likely that New York
State would succeed on the merits of its monopolization and attempted
monopolization claims, the Second Circuit found that it was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to grant the preliminary injunction.76 The
Second Circuit’s ruling was consistent with several previous decisions by
district courts in other cases involving alleged “product hopping.”77

68. See id. at 647.
69. Id. at 647–48.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 648.
72. Id. at 649.
73. Id. at 653 (citing Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 n.39
(2d Cir. 1979)).
74. Id. at 654.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 651.
77. See, e.g., Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 WL
1736957 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (granting summary judgment to the defendant even though
it withdrew an old product from the market, because the relevant market contained a variety
of similar products); In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 685 (E.D. Pa.
2014) (holding that allegations that a pharmaceutical company threatened to remove a
product from the market and did remove it a few weeks after entry of generic into market
stated a viable Sherman Act claim); Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp.
2d 146, 150–52 (D.D.C. 2008) (dismissing Sherman Act claims because the plaintiffs had
not alleged that any consumer choices were eliminated).
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II. HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS
The Second Circuit has taken a leading role among the circuits in
consistently condemning price fixing among competitors as restraints on
trade that are per se unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act.78 At the
same time, the Second Circuit has attempted to avoid labels in favor of
analyzing the substance of transactions to determine whether they are
subject to the per se rule, following the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.79 (BMI), which arose in the Southern
District of New York and is one of the most influential decisions relating to
price restraints. As the Supreme Court noted in BMI, “certain agreements
or practices are so ‘plainly anticompetitive,’ and so often ‘lack . . . any
redeeming virtue,’ that they are conclusively presumed illegal without
further examination under the rule of reason generally applied in Sherman
Act cases.”80
Nevertheless, what constitutes a per se illegal practice has not always
been clear, even when those practices involve “price fixing” in the literal
sense. The Supreme Court observed in BMI that “easy labels do not always
supply ready answers”81 and warned that a literal approach “does not alone
establish that [a] particular practice . . . is ‘plainly anticompetitive’ and very
likely without ‘redeeming virtue.’”82 As business relationships have
become increasingly complex, the Second Circuit has grappled with
whether the per se rule or rule of reason analysis should apply to various
pricing situations, looking to the Supreme Court’s BMI decision for
guidance and analyzing the substance of a transaction to determine whether
it is per se illegal. The Second Circuit has adopted a markedly cautious
approach to expanding the categories to which the per se rule applies,
arguably leading the way in shaping the per se doctrine since BMI.
This restraint is evident in the Second Circuit’s decisions in Volvo North
American Corp. v. Men’s International Professional Tennis Council83 and
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC,84 as well as the Second Circuit’s
more recent decisions, such as Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v.
Salvino, Inc.85 These cases illustrate a shift toward a focus on the
underlying economic rationality of the business arrangement at issue and
away from mechanical characterizations. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s
favorable reference to Salvino in its 2010 opinion in American Needle, Inc.
78. See, e.g., Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 71
(2d Cir. 1988).
79. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
80. Id. at 8 (first quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
692 (1978); then quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). Under the
rule of reason analysis, when a particular practice can be justified by legitimate business
considerations, courts weigh the benefits of the practice against the negative effects on
competition.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 9.
83. 857 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988).
84. 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
85. 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008).
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v. National Football League86 is a testament to the Second Circuit’s
influence on this issue. On the other hand, the Second Circuit recently
applied the per se rule in its decision in United States v. Apple, Inc.,87
applying the rule to U.S. ebook publishers, noting that the BMI line of
decisions was “narrow” and “limited” in scope.88 Whether, and to what
extent, Apple represents a departure from the restraint evident in the Second
Circuit’s post-BMI jurisprudence remains to be seen.
A. BMI
The evolution of the Second Circuit’s cautionary approach to the per se
rule as applied to horizontal restraints is best viewed in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in BMI. The BMI case originated in 1975 in the Southern
District of New York, when Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS)
brought suit against two music agencies, the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), and Broadcast Music, Inc.
(BMI), challenging their royalty practices.89 CBS alleged that the system
by which these agencies (which act as clearing houses for music copyright
owners and users) received fees for their issuance of “blanket licenses” to
perform copyrighted musical compositions constituted illegal price fixing.90
BMI and ASCAP had nonexclusive rights to grant blanket licenses of an
artist’s work to people or companies that sought to obtain the rights to use a
particular work.91 Artists and composers joined with ASCAP and BMI to
set a price for the blanket license.92 Thus, for an annual fee, a licensee like
CBS could gain the rights to use any song in a writer’s repertoire but could
not license individual works through BMI or ASCAP. It could, however,
negotiate licenses for individual works directly through the copyright
holders, because BMI and ASCAP were nonexclusive licensors.
Nevertheless, CBS argued that the blanket license violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act, among other provisions.93
The district court dismissed CBS’s case following a trial only on liability
issues, finding that the blanket license did not constitute a per se violation
of section 1.94 The court also found that the blanket license was not an
unreasonable restraint on trade because CBS was free to negotiate with
individual copyright holders.95 The Second Circuit reversed and remanded
the decision, holding, in a very literal analysis of the defendant’s conduct,
that the blanket licensing arrangement was unlawful price fixing because
the composers and publishing houses had “joined together into an

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

560 U.S. 183 (2010).
791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016).
Id. at 325–26 (citing Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 203).
Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1979).
See id. at 5.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 5–6.
See id. at 6.
See id.
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organization that sets its price for the blanket license it sells,” which
constituted a per se violation of section 1.96
The Supreme Court reversed, refusing to apply the per se rule to the
blanket license at issue in BMI.97 The Court acknowledged the value of the
per se rule, but criticized the Second Circuit’s “literal approach” in applying
it, explaining that “when two partners set the price of their goods or
services they are literally ‘price fixing,’ but they are not per se in violation
of the Sherman Act.”98 The Court concluded that before a particular
practice can be condemned under the per se rule, it must be found to be
Because the alleged restraint, blanket
“plainly anticompetitive.”99
licensing, was not within the group of business practices to which the per se
rule had been applied previously, there was no “nearly universal” view on
whether these practices should be subject to “automatic condemnation”
rather than “a careful assessment under the rule of reason.”100 Noting that
the commerce involved—obtaining the performing rights to copyrighted
music—exists only because of copyright law, and that the marketing
arrangement was reasonably necessary to monitor the use of thousands of
copyrighted materials, the Supreme Court concluded there was no
anticompetitive purpose behind the use of the blanket licenses at issue.101
B. Buffalo Broadcasting, Volvo and du Pont
After the BMI decision, the Second Circuit took a cautious approach to
the application of the per se rule. First, in an action by local broadcasting
affiliates against BMI and ASCAP, raising virtually the same issues as the
original BMI case, Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. American Society of
Composers, Authors & Publishers,102 the Second Circuit followed the
Supreme Court’s holding and concluded that blanket licensing to affiliate
stations did not constitute an unreasonable restraint on trade subject to the
per se rule.103
The Second Circuit also took a restrained approach in applying the per se
rule to alleged horizontal price fixing and horizontal division of markets in
several aspects of men’s professional tennis events in its decision in
Volvo.104 There, three sponsors of men’s professional tennis events brought
suit against a tennis governing body, the Men’s International Professional
Tennis Council (MIPTC), its chairman, and its administrator, claiming that
MIPTC had improperly conspired with a rival organization, World
Championship Tennis, Inc., to restrain trade in men’s tennis in violation of

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
1988).

Id. at 8.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 20–21.
744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 933.
Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55 (2d Cir.

124

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

In particular, the sponsors and producers of tennis
section 1.105
tournaments alleged that the governing organizations had established
agreements with sponsors, producers, and players that dictated tournament
scheduling priority, limited player compensation, and discouraged players,
sponsors, and producers from participating in independent tennis events.106
Volvo argued that these agreements limited the number of successful and
profitable events that could be sponsored outside of the governing bodies’
control.107
On appeal from the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint,
the Second Circuit examined the allegations of horizontal restraints—price
fixing, horizontal market division, and group boycott—and considered
whether the allegations were sufficient to fall under per se illegal conduct.
The Second Circuit noted that, normally, price fixing agreements among
competitors are considered per se illegal under section 1, but, adding some
subtlety to a seemingly simple analysis, the court emphasized that the
“relevant inquiry . . . involves more than ‘a question simply of determining
whether two or more potential competitors have literally “fixed” a
“price,”’” because determining when a practice should be characterized as
price fixing could be very difficult.108
Ultimately, the Second Circuit “express[ed] no opinion” as to whether
the conduct was per se unlawful or subject to the rule of reason.109 Instead,
the court directed on remand of the section 1 claim that the district court
“carefully consider whatever arguments [the alleged price fixer] may offer
in support of [its] practices relating to player compensation before deciding
whether the per se rule or the [r]ule of [r]eason should apply.”110 With
respect to the horizontal market division and group boycott claims, the
court noted that it viewed the claims as adequately alleged, but again
remanded the question of whether the per se rule or the rule of reason
should apply to the district court.111
Similarly, the Second Circuit’s decision in du Pont illustrates the court’s
resistance to expanding the per se rule to section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (“the FTC Act”).112 The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) had prohibited du Pont, Ethyl Corporation, and other compound
manufacturers from announcing price changes before the thirty days
provided by their contracts and from using “most favored nation” clauses
regarding the price of their additives.113 The FTC challenged these
practices even though the FTC conceded that the practices were not the
result of any collusive agreement.114 Rather, these practices occurred in an
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id. at 57–63.
See id. at 58.
See id. at 60–61.
Id. at 71 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)).
Id.
Id. at 72.
See id. at 72–73.
See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 130–32.
See id. at 135.
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oligopolistic market characterized by high concentration, a small likelihood
of new entrants because of a sharply declining market, inelastic demand,
and homogeneity of product.115
The Second Circuit vacated the FTC’s order, finding that the “mere
existence of an oligopolistic market structure in which a small group of
manufacturers engage in consciously parallel pricing of an identical product
does not violate the antitrust laws.”116 The court rejected price signaling as
a basis for liability under the FTC Act, noting that the FTC’s position could
be construed to condemn any price increase by any seller in an oligopolistic
market.117 Before labeling business conduct in an oligopolistic industry
(absent tacit agreement) as “unfair” within the meaning of section 5, the
court held that the FTC must allege that, at a minimum, “some indicia of
oppressiveness” exist.118 The Second Circuit’s decision in du Pont has
been influential across the country: the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits have cited this holding from du Pont with approval in also rejecting
a categorical approach to analyzing antitrust activity involving
oligopolies.119
C. Salvino, American Needle, and Apple
The Second Circuit has continued, for the most part, to take a restrained
approach in applying the per se rule in more recent decisions addressing
horizontal restraints. Following BMI, other circuits adopted similarly
cautious approaches to treating business arrangements among would-be
competitors—especially business practices with which the court was
unfamiliar—as per se restraints on trade.120 Commentators have noted,
however, that some federal appellate courts have gone further than the
Second Circuit in eroding traditional prohibitions against horizontal
restraints such as the per se rule.121
The Second Circuit’s restrained approach is evident in its 2008 decision
in Major League Baseball Properties v. Salvino, Inc.122 In Salvino, the
court held that the rule of reason—not the per se rule or quick-look
doctrine—was the appropriate analytical tool to use in determining whether
an exclusive license of every Major League Baseball (MLB) teams’

115. See id. at 139–40.
116. Id. at 139.
117. Id. at 137–39.
118. Id. at 139.
119. See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1031
(8th Cir. 2000); Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 971 F.2d 37, 50
(7th Cir. 1992); Liggett Grp., Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335,
342 (4th Cir. 1992); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 444 (9th Cir. 1990).
120. See California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2011);
Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 825 (6th Cir. 2011); All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v.
High Tech Staffing Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 740, 747 (11th Cir. 1998).
121. See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 22, at 825–26, 826 n.235.
122. 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008).
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intellectual property to Major League Baseball Properties (MLBP) illegally
restrained trade.123
In Salvino, a company that made and sold plush bean-filled bears
featuring the logo of certain MLB clubs counterclaimed against MLBP, the
exclusive licensing agent for MLB intellectual property, claiming that the
centralization of the licensing in a single agent and the sharing of profits
equally among all the MLB clubs were per se illegal under section 1.124
The district court granted MLBP’s motion for summary judgment
dismissing Salvino’s section 1 counterclaims, holding that the rule of reason
should be used to analyze MLBP’s licensing of MLB’s intellectual property
and that Salvino had failed to show that MLBP and its activities had an
actual adverse effect on competition or that MLBP had sufficient market
power to inhibit competition market-wide.125 On appeal, Salvino pressed
its contentions that the MLB’s centralization of intellectual property
licensing for baseball teams and purported output restrictions were “naked
horizontal” restraints that were per se illegal.126 The Second Circuit
rejected these claims, recognizing that the centralization of MLB
intellectual property licensing was similar to the blanket licensing held not
to be per se unlawful in BMI.127 The court affirmed the award of summary
judgment to MLBP, concluding that simply making MLBP the exclusive
licensor did not restrict or reduce the number of licenses to be used—“it
merely alter[ed] the identity of the licenses’ issuer.”128 The Second Circuit
also emphasized the high threshold for applying the per se rule: “To justify
a per se prohibition a restraint must have manifestly anticompetitive
effects, . . . and lack . . . any redeeming virtue.”129 Concurring in the
judgment, then-Circuit Judge Sotomayor noted that the per se and quicklook approaches were “reserved for practices that facially appear to be ones
that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output.”130 This aspect of then-Judge Sotomayor’s concurrence in
Salvino has been cited by the Ninth and Federal Circuits in requiring
scrutiny of joint ventures and profit-sharing arrangements under the rule of
reason.131
The Second Circuit’s opinion, including the concurrence, in Salvino has
shaped subsequent law in this area, leading other courts to judge similar
conduct under the rule of reason. In its 2010 decision in American Needle,
Inc. v. National Football League,132 the Supreme Court reviewed similar

123. Id.
124. Id. at 294–96.
125. Id. at 293–94.
126. Id. at 318.
127. See id. at 321–23.
128. Id. at 318.
129. Id. at 316 (omissions in original) (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)).
130. Id. at 340 n.10 (Sotomayer, J., concurring).
131. See, e.g., California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir.
2011); Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
132. 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
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licensing practices by the thirty-two National Football League (NFL) teams,
which had formed a separate corporation, National Football League
Properties (NFLP), to manage their intellectual property. In finding that the
NFLP was not a single economic enterprise capable of taking “independent
action” but, rather, that its licensing activities constituted concerted action
that must be judged under the rule of reason,133 the Supreme Court
favorably cited then-Circuit Judge Sotomayor’s concurrence in Salvino,
where the Judge departed from her colleagues and found the existence of a
price agreement, warning that “competitors ‘cannot simply get around’
antitrust liability by acting ‘through a third-party intermediary or ‘joint
venture.’”134 The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the restraint was “essential” or otherwise justified under the rule of
reason.135
In a recent antitrust action, United States v. Apple, Inc.,136 the Second
Circuit once again addressed the per se rule. The majority, applying the per
se rule with renewed vigor, affirmed the Southern District’s application of
the rule to government allegations that Apple, a customer of five of the
nation’s major ebook publishers, orchestrated a horizontal agreement
among the publishers to increase the price of ebooks through the use of an
agency distribution model under which the publishers, not resellers, would
determine retail prices.137 Before Apple launched the iPad, it entered into
contracts with five of the six major publishing houses.138 The government
asserted that the contracts incentivized the publishers to prevent Amazon
from continuing to sell bestsellers and new releases for $9.99, a price that
Apple believed was unsustainable.139
In a sharply divided decision, two judges of the panel agreed that the per
se rule applied to Apple’s conduct, rather than the rule of reason.140 The
court emphasized that the conduct at issue was not the individual vertical
contracts with Apple, but rather the fact that “Apple’s offer to the
133. See id. at 186.
134. See id. at 202 (quoting Salvino, 542 F.3d at 336 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)); see
also N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 372 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing
American Needle’s quotation of Salvino in holding that members of the State Board of
Dental Examiners had capacity to conspire under section 1).
135. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 204.
136. 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016). Author Saul
Morgenstern and a team of Kaye Scholer lawyers assisted a publisher in connection with the
U.S. Department of Justice investigation that led to the litigation (the client was not named
as a defendant in the case), and now represent a publisher in connection with related
litigation and compliance with the final judgment resulting from the publisher’s settlement of
the government’s claims.
137. Id. at 297.
138. See id. at 296.
139. See id. at 305–07.
140. In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Raymond Lohier stated “[i]n my view,
Apple’s appeal rises or falls based on the application of the per se rule” and that he would
affirm on that basis alone. Id. at 339 (Lohier, J., concurring). While noting “some surface
appeal to Apple’s argument that the ebook market, in light of Amazon’s virtually
uncontested dominance, needed more competition,” Judge Lohier admonished that “more
corporate bullying is not an appropriate antidote to corporate bullying.” Id. at 340.
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[p]ublisher [d]efendants hinged on whether it could successfully help
organize them to force Amazon to an agency model and then to use their
newfound collective control to raise ebook prices.”141 This “use of the
promise of higher prices as a bargaining chip to induce the [p]ublisher
[d]efendants to participate in the iBookstore constituted a conscious
commitment to the goal of raising ebook prices.”142 The Second Circuit, in
an opinion written by Judge Debra Livingston with a concurrence in part
and in the judgment by Judge Raymond Lohier, rejected the argument that
Apple should have been permitted to introduce procompetitive justifications
for horizontal price-fixing arrangements, stating that its conspiracy to raise
prices was squarely in the focus of the per se rule and that the BMI line of
cases was “limited to situations where the ‘restraints on competition are
essential if the product is to be available at all.’”143 Even if BMI were read
broadly, Judge Livingston continued, the BMI line of cases applied the rule
of reason “only when the restraint at issue was imposed in connection with
some kind of potentially efficient joint venture.”144
In a strong dissent, Judge Dennis Jacobs argued that the court erred in
holding that Apple’s conduct fell within the per se rule. He urged that a
proper application of the rule of reason test would find that Apple’s conduct
was “unambiguously and overwhelmingly pro-competitive” because it
sought to introduce another player into the ebooks market to challenge
Amazon’s monopoly.145
The sharp differences in the majority and dissenting opinions reflect the
difficulties presented where a customer seeks to enter a market by offering
similar terms to multiple sellers. Ordinarily, the sellers’ parallel conduct in
response would not give rise to an inference of conspiracy. The record in
Apple, however, contained evidence from which the district court concluded
that the publishers’ parallel conduct was not an accident but rather the result
of agreement, which Apple willingly facilitated. The majority opinion was
no doubt influenced by those findings.146
141. Id. at 317 (majority opinion).
142. Id. “[T]he relevant ‘agreement in restraint of trade’ in this case is not Apple’s
vertical Contracts with the Publisher Defendants . . . .” Id. at 323.
143. Id. at 326 (quoting Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203
(2010)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 341 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
146. The fact that, as the dissent noted, the industry shift to agency may have been
necessary to facilitate the creation of competition for a preexisting dominant retailer would
not alone rescue collective horizontal action from censure. While it has long been
established under federal law that a company is free to deal, or not deal, with whomever it
chooses, the Second Circuit in Judge Hand’s 1940 opinion in Fashion Originators Guild of
America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940), aff’d, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), held that a group of
competing dress and textile designers could not band together and condition their sales to
retailers on the retailers agreeing not to use or sell designs copied from Fashion Originators
Guild members’ designs, in an effort to prevent other dressmakers and textile manufacturers
from copying their designs. Id. at 84. Such concerted action constituted illegal group
boycott prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Id.; see, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Tobacco
Growers v. Neal, 183 F.2d 869, 873 (4th Cir. 1950); Local 36 of Int’l Fisherman & Allied
Workers v. United States, 177 F.2d 320, 331 (9th Cir. 1949). Other circuits have followed
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III. DAMAGES UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The Second Circuit has played a key role in defining the proper measure
of damages under the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, which prohibits
anticompetitive price discrimination and is violated where “the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition.”147 To
recover damages for Robinson-Patman Act violations under the Clayton
Act, however, purchasers alleging unlawful price discrimination must
demonstrate actual damages attributable to the discrimination. Courts have
struggled to determine the proper theory of damages for such price
discrimination. The Second Circuit was one of the first circuit courts to
take on this issue in its 1957 decision in Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas
Co.,148 where Texas Company (“Texaco”) was represented on appeal by
Professor Milton Handler,149 one of the leading antitrust practitioners and
scholars of the twentieth century. Before Enterprise, the Eighth Circuit had
adopted the theory that the victim of price discrimination could
automatically recover the difference between the higher price it paid and the
lower price charged to its favored competitor.150 Writing for the Second
Circuit, Judge Learned Hand rejected that “automatic damages” theory.
More than twenty years later, Judge Hand’s alternative theory would figure
prominently in the Supreme Court’s determination of the proper measure of
damages for Robinson-Patman Act claims in J. Truett Payne Co. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp.151
The claims in Enterprise arose from price wars among competing gas
stations along the main commuter route between New York and Hartford.
The plaintiff operated one of the stations and brought Robinson-Patman Act
claims against Texaco for charging the plaintiff more for gasoline than it
charged its own stations positioned along the same commuter route during
the price wars.152 The Connecticut district court concluded that Texaco’s
pricing scheme was discriminatory and awarded the plaintiff damages
measured by the difference between what Texaco charged its own stations
and what it charged the plaintiff153 under the so-called “automatic
damages” theory.154

Judge Hand’s reasoning in Fashion Originators Guild that such concerted “self-help”
violates the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Tobacco Growers, 183 F.2d at 873; Local
36 of Int’l Fisherman, 177 F.2d at 331.
147. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 559 n.1 (1981)
(emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012)).
148. 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1957).
149. In addition to being a member of the faculty of Columbia Law School, Professor
Handler was a member of the New York law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler, now named Kaye Scholer LLP.
150. See, e.g., Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 990, 996 (8th
Cir. 1945) (affirming trial court’s award of treble damages on the difference between the
price plaintiff was charged and the lower price competitors were charged).
151. 451 U.S. 557, 568 (1981).
152. See Enterprise, 240 F.2d at 457–58.
153. See Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 560–61.
154. See id. at 561 n.2.
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The Second Circuit reversed, finding that, even if Texaco’s price
structure was discriminatory, the plaintiff had failed to prove not only the
amount of damages, but it also failed to prove that it had suffered any
damages at all. Judge Hand also rejected the automatic damages theory,
concluding that, because the Robinson-Patman Act was aimed at preventing
a favored purchaser from siphoning sales from a disfavored purchaser, the
proper measure of damages would be the profits from the potential sales the
plaintiff lost to competitors because of the defendant’s discriminatory
pricing scheme, less any profits it made because it was free under Texaco’s
pricing scheme to charge higher prices for gasoline than its competitors.155
But, because the plaintiff had failed to introduce at trial reliable figures
from which its alleged lost sales and profits could be calculated, the Second
Circuit held that no damages could be awarded.156
Between 1957 and 1981, the circuits were split on the proper measure of
damages under the Robinson-Patman Act. While the Seventh, Eighth and
Ninth Circuits adopted the automatic damages measure,157 the Third,
Fourth and Sixth Circuits followed the Second Circuit’s lead in
Enterprise.158 The Fifth Circuit endorsed the Second Circuit’s approach in
Enterprise in its 1979 decision in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne,
Inc.159 Truett Payne, a Chrysler dealership, claimed that Chrysler engaged
in unlawful price discrimination when it required some dealers to sell more
cars than others to qualify for the same bonus. After a jury trial, the district
court awarded treble damages based on the difference between the bonus
the Truett Payne dealership actually received and what it would have
received under a lawful bonus scheme. The Fifth Circuit reversed, but did
not decide whether Truett Payne in fact proved that Chrysler had violated
the Robinson-Patman Act. Instead, the court went directly to the question
of damages and concluded that Truett Payne had “failed to introduce
substantial evidence of injury attributable to [Chrysler’s program], much
less substantial evidence of the amount of such injury.”160 In so holding,
155. See Enterprise, 240 F.2d at 459–60.
156. See id. at 458–59.
157. See Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170, 174–75 (7th Cir. 1976); Fowler Mfg. Co.
v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1251–52 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing Enterprise as a leading case for
the opposing view on the measure of damages under Robinson-Patman); Elizabeth Arden
Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir. 1945).
158. See Dantzler v. Dictograph Prods., Inc., 309 F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1962)
(following Enterprise and concluding that a person claiming damages under the RobinsonPatman Act must “show the causal connection between the losses he suffers and the illegal
acts of the defendant”); Freedman v. Phila. Terminals Auction Co., 301 F.2d 830, 833–34
(3d Cir. 1962); Kidd v. Esso Standard Oil, 295 F.2d 497, 498 (6th Cir. 1961) (affirming
district court’s finding that plaintiff was not entitled to a damages award because “[t]he
record fails to show that [plaintiff’s competitors] . . . lowered the price at which they sold to
the public, at all; nor is there proof in the record to show or tend to show that, during the
period involved, the plaintiff-appellant lost any customers, or that he lost any profits”).
159. 607 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1979). The Fifth Circuit had previously affirmed a district
court ruling also applying the Enterprise approach without issuing a written opinion. See
McCaskill v. Texaco, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1332, 1341 (S.D. Ala. 1972), aff’d, 486 F.2d 1400
(5th Cir. 1973).
160. Truett Payne, 607 F.2d. at 1135.
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the Fifth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s theory of price discrimination
damages set forth in Enterprise.161
The Supreme Court affirmed, in an opinion by Justice William
Rehnquist, following the Second Circuit in soundly rejecting the “automatic
damages theory,” and citing the Second Circuit’s opinion in Enterprise as
the “leading case” rejecting the theory.162 The Court held that to “recover
treble damages . . . a plaintiff must make some showing of actual injury
attributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent”163
and agreed with the Second Circuit’s conclusion in Enterprise that the mere
fact of price discrimination is not by itself evidence of injury.164 The Court
remanded Truett Payne to the Fifth Circuit to consider whether Chrysler’s
bonus scheme actually violated the Robinson-Patman Act.165 The Second
Circuit’s influence also extended to the partial dissent in Truett Payne:
Justice Powell cited favorably to Judge Hand’s decision in Enterprise for
the proposition that plaintiffs can recover damages under section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act only by showing that unlawful price discrimination
“allowed a favored competitor to draw sales or profits” from the disfavored
competitor.166 Courts continue to rely on Enterprise’s clean articulation of
the measure of damages under the Robinson-Patman Act.167

161. See id. at 1136.
162. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 561 n.2 (1981).
163. Id. at 562.
164. Id.
165. Four Justices joined Justice Powell’s partial dissent, which favored affirming the
Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the plaintiff had “failed to introduce substantial evidence of
injury attributable to [respondent’s program], much less substantial evidence of the amount
of such injury.” Id. at 569 (Powell, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Truett
Payne, 607 F.2d at 1135).
166. Id. On remand, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Truett Payne did not introduce
sufficient evidence of the violation or of its injuries to withstand Chrysler’s motions for
directed verdict. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., 670 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir.
1982).
167. See, e.g., Dominguez v. UAL Corp., 666 F.3d 1359, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing to
Justice Powell’s discussion of Enterprise in his partial dissent in Truett Payne); Drug Mart
Pharmacy Corp. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp, 472 F. Supp. 2d 385, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(citing to Enterprise for the proposition that “the pricing margin caused by the illegal
discrimination can only be used to quantify damages if the plaintiffs demonstrate that the
favored purchasers lowered their prices in an amount equivalent to the illegal benefit they
received” in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment—argued by author Saul
Morgenstern—dismissing claims of “representative plaintiffs”). Drug Mart has a tortured
history, during which plaintiffs were at pains to show that the lower prices that defendant
pharmaceutical manufacturers gave to favored purchasers actually caused smaller
pharmacies to lose sales. Using the Enterprise approach to damage analysis, the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York crafted a process to identify customers that
plaintiff pharmacies lost to a favored competitor. After this process revealed that plaintiffs
lost very few customers, the court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants.
See Drug Mart Pharmacy Corp. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 93-CV-5148, 2012 WL
3544771, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. August 16, 2012).
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IV. ANTITRUST STANDING:
WHO CAN SUE FOR AN ANTITRUST VIOLATION?
Antitrust violations can, in certain circumstances, have a ripple effect of
injuries throughout the market. The bare language of the Clayton Act gives
an apparently unlimited right of action for damages to “any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws.”168 Yet, almost from its enactment, courts have
narrowed its reach.169
A. The Supreme Court’s Limitations on Antitrust Standing
Drawing on the legislative history of the Clayton and Sherman Acts and
common law principles limiting liability to reasonably foreseeable injuries,
the Supreme Court in 1972 set some limits on standing to bring antitrust
actions in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California.170 There, the Court
said that states could not sue for damages attributable to violations of
antitrust laws because such suits would open the door to “duplicative
recovery.”171 Then, in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready,172 the
Supreme Court squarely addressed the apparent conflict between these
court-imposed limits and the Clayton Act’s broad language.173 Antitrust
violations can cause cascading injuries throughout the market, and the
Court sought to limit antitrust standing to prevent duplicative recovery from
defendants to remedy every injury.174 The Court declined to take a position
on the various tests articulated in the circuit courts175 and refused “to
engraft artificial limits on the [s]ection 4 remedy.”176 Instead, the Court set
forth a two-step analysis that required courts to look
(1) [t]o the physical and economic nexus between the alleged violation
and the harm to the plaintiff, and (2) more particularly, to the relationship
of the injury alleged with those forms of injury about which Congress was

168. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). The Clayton Act amended the Sherman Act’s equally
broad provision that “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any
other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by
this act may sue therefor in any Circuit Court of the United States.” Sherman Act, ch. 647, §
7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). Persons include corporations and associations existing under the
federal law or the law of any State or foreign country. See 15 U.S.C. § 7. Although section 4
limits recovery for foreign states to actual damages plus costs and attorney’s fees, see 15
U.S.C. § 15(b), it otherwise imposes no limits on the persons who can bring suits or the type
of damages that injured persons are eligible to recover.
169. See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 707 (3d Cir. 1910) (denying
recovery to stockholders injured by antitrust violations because they were not directly
injured).
170. 405 U.S. 251 (1972); see id. at 264.
171. Id. at 263–64.
172. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
173. Id. at 472–74 (citing Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 274); see also Cavanagh, supra note
22, at 810–18.
174. McCready, 457 U.S. at 474.
175. Id. at 476 n.12, 478 n.14.
176. Id. at 472.
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likely to have been concerned in making defendant’s conduct unlawful
and in providing a private remedy under [section] 4.177

McCready’s insurer refused to reimburse her for psychotherapy because
she was treated by a psychologist rather than a psychiatrist.178 McCready
alleged that her insurer had colluded with psychiatrists to exclude
psychologists from providing psychotherapy by refusing to cover services
that were similar or identical to what a psychiatrist would provide.179 The
Court agreed that McCready’s injuries—the denial of insurance benefits—
gave her standing to sue.180 The Court refused to deny a remedy to
psychologists, who were the intended target of the conspiracy, concluding
that McCready’s injury also arose from “that which makes defendants’ acts
unlawful.”181
A year later, the Supreme Court muddied the antitrust standing waters in
its opinion in Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters.182
There, two unions alleged that an association of
construction contractors had coerced their members into hiring nonunion
workers with the goal of sabotaging union workers and the construction
contractors who hired them.183 The Court held that the unions’ injuries,
unlike McCready’s, were the indirect effects of antitrust violations squarely
aimed at construction firms and individual union members.184 In reaching
its decision, the Court set forth a list of six factors relevant to antitrust
standing without explicitly stating that the factors constitute a test for
standing: (1) the “causal connection between an antitrust violation and
harm to the [plaintiff],” (2) “the nature of the plaintiff’s injury” and whether
it is the type of injury that the antitrust laws were intended to vindicate, (3)
“the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury,” (4) “the existence of
an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate
them to vindicate the public interest in alleged antitrust enforcement” and
whether plaintiff is within that class, (5) the speculative nature of the
damages claim, and (6) the “potential for duplicative recovery or complex
apportionment of damages.”185
B. Antitrust Standing in the Second Circuit After
McCready and Associated General Contractors
In 1983, in the wake of McCready and Associated General Contractors,
the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Henry Friendly, took a fresh
look at antitrust standing in Crimpers Promotions, Inc. v. Home Box Office,

177. Id. at 478.
178. Id. at 468.
179. Id. at 469–70.
180. Id. at 479.
181. Id. at 484 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977)).
182. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
183. Id. at 520–21.
184. Id. at 539–44.
185. Id. at 537–45.
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Inc.186 Judge Friendly explained that McCready signaled a liberalization of
the notion of antitrust injury, because the Supreme Court explicitly
acknowledged that individuals need not be direct competitors of defendants
to have standing to bring antitrust claims,187 and found not only that the
standing analysis in Associated General Contractors was entirely consistent
with McCready but that it actually strengthened Crimpers’ case.188
Crimpers Promotions was formed to host a single trade show that would
bring together all producers of cable television programming in a single
forum to facilitate purchase of programming from individual producers,
rather than simply in packages created by defendants Home Box Office
(HBO) and Showtime.189 Crimpers alleged that HBO and Showtime
contacted producers and told them not to attend the show, that it was a “ripoff” and a fraud, and that no exhibitors would attend.190 The trade show
ultimately took place, but with dismal attendance by exhibitors and
producers.191
Crimpers teaches that the purpose underlying the antitrust laws provides
two limitations on antitrust standing: First, antitrust standing should be
limited to prevent double recovery. Second, it should exclude those injuries
that are “too remote” from the alleged antitrust violation.192 To assess
remoteness, courts should look to the “physical and economic nexus
between the alleged violation and the harm” and the relationship between
the alleged injuries and the sort of injury Congress sought to prevent in
enacting the antitrust laws.193 The Second Circuit refused to find that
Crimpers was not “the victim of a successful boycott” or that Crimpers
lacked standing simply because it “was not a buyer or seller but was
endeavoring to provide a method whereby buyers and sellers could deal
effectively with each other without paying tribute to the defendants.”194
The Court thus concluded that, “free[d] . . . from the miasma of adjectives
that has accumulated around the words of [section] 4,” Crimpers presents a
“paradigm of standing.”195 Other circuits have continued to rely on
Crimpers’s explanation of the factors relevant to antitrust standing and, in
particular, on its reconciliation of McCready with Associated General
Contractors.196
186. 724 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1983).
187. Id. at 292.
188. Id. at 293.
189. Id. at 291.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 294 (citing Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982)).
193. Id. (citing McCready, 457 U.S. at 466).
194. Id. at 297.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62, 77 (3d Cir.
2000) (finding Crimpers “persuasive” in explaining that an injury was a direct consequence
of an antitrust violation), abrogated on other grounds by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 2011); Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494,
1511–12 (9th Cir. 1996) (following Crimpers in concluding that plaintiffs have standing to
challenge defendant’s antitrust violations even if they are not direct competitors, so long as
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Five years later, in Volvo, the Second Circuit considered whether the
organizer of professional men’s tennis tournaments could be liable under
the antitrust laws to a sponsor of those tournaments.197 The two governing
bodies that oversee men’s professional tennis tournaments had entered into
an agreement that limited compensation for players, gave certain
tournaments scheduling priority, and generally required players
participating in prestigious tournaments to agree to participate in certain
tournaments organized by either governing body, and not to participate in
other tennis events that competed with them.198 The expenses of running
the tournaments were borne by sponsors, such as plaintiff Volvo.199 Volvo
was also a producer of tennis tournaments and had itself entered into certain
restrictive agreements with the governing bodies.200 Nevertheless, Volvo
filed an antitrust action against one of the governing bodies, arguing that the
agreements limited its ability to produce tennis tournaments in the manner it
preferred and caused the events it did produce and sponsor to be less
profitable than they otherwise might have been.201
The Second Circuit thus had to consider whether Volvo, which
voluntarily entered the restrictive cartel of professional tennis tournaments,
had standing to challenge the actions of that cartel. Following McCready,
the court fashioned a two-part test, under which the court first asks whether
the plaintiff has prima facie standing, then considers whether any of a range
of factors would defeat standing.202 The primary rationale behind the Volvo
test is that the antitrust laws were enacted to protect competition, not
competitors, so if a member of a cartel would be better off if it were free to
compete, and its own interests align with the public interest in competition,
then the cartel member has standing to challenge the cartel’s antitrust
violations.203 The Second Circuit reiterated that an antitrust injury is an
injury of the sort antitrust laws were intended to prevent, and one that flows
from the defendant’s antitrust violations. Once a plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged an antitrust injury, courts then consider whether the factors set forth
in Associated General Contractors nonetheless defeat plaintiff’s
standing.204
Finally, in R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V.,205 the Second Circuit
moved more completely toward a holistic, fact-intensive analysis of
they compete in a particular market segment); see also Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title,
Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1495 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that, in Crimpers, the Second Circuit
“has aligned itself with the liberal standing approach of [McCready] and distinguished
Associated General [Contractors] as not limiting the application of [McCready]”).
197. Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir.
1988).
198. Id. at 59.
199. Id. at 58.
200. Id. at 59.
201. Id. at 60–61.
202. Id. at 68.
203. Id. at 67.
204. Id. at 66 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 540–45 (1983)).
205. 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1989).
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antitrust standing in the merger area. Bigelow, an herbal tea producer,
sought to enjoin the merger of two rival tea sellers—Lipton and Celestial
Seasonings, the two largest herbal tea producers in the market—because the
merged entity would control 84 percent of the herbal tea market and,
therefore, would substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly.206 The district court granted Unilever’s motion for summary
judgment, finding that Bigelow’s evidence about the amount of the market
share was not sufficient to establish standing, and stating that more specific
factual allegations and evidence were needed—either evidence of past
predatory pricing or of present intent to engage in predatory behavior
postmerger.207 Reversing the district court, the Second Circuit held that
Bigelow, as a competitor of the merging parties, had standing to challenge
the merger.208 The court concluded that a postacquisition market share of
84 percent constituted “prima facie evidence of monopoly power” and “is
so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be
enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not
likely to have such anticompetitive effects.”209 Although the court declined
to adopt a per se rule that an 84 percent market share violates section 7 of
the Clayton Act, it concluded that the market share data created a genuine
issue of material fact precluding the grant of summary judgment to
Unilever.210 In contrast to their endorsement of Crimpers, other circuits
have been less inclined to follow the Second Circuit in Bigelow.211
In sum, as the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence on standing has developed,
determining whether a particular plaintiff has standing to pursue an antitrust
claim has become a highly contextual and fact-intensive inquiry. It has also
pushed other circuits toward a more liberal approach to antitrust
standing.212
V. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S CONTRIBUTION
TO THE LAW OF PLEADING STANDARDS AFTER
BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBLY
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), adopted in 1937, provides that “[a]
pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”213
When the rule was adopted, there was discussion of separate, stricter
requirements for antitrust, patent, copyright, and other allegedly special
types of litigation, but such proposals were rejected in favor of a uniform,
206. Id. at 104, 107–10.
207. Id. at 105.
208. Id. at 107–11.
209. Id. at 108 (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963)
(emphasis removed)).
210. Id. at 111.
211. See, e.g., Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Med. Prods., Inc., 976 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1992)
(noting that the Fifth Circuit has parted company with the Second Circuit on antitrust
standing in Bigelow and other cases).
212. See supra note 196.
213. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
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liberal pleading standard. Despite this liberal standard, over the decades
since Rule 8(a) was adopted, defense lawyers continued to advocate for,
and courts occasionally applied, a heightened pleading rule in antitrust
actions because of the great expense often involved, especially in class
actions. Those arguments made little headway until the Supreme Court’s
2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.214
In Twombly, a class of consumers sued local telephone and internet
service providers, alleging an antitrust conspiracy—based on parallel
conduct—to prevent competitive entry into local telephone and Internet
service markets and to avoid competing with each other in their respective
markets.215 In a 2005 opinion by Judge Robert Sack, the Second Circuit
reversed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the district court had
erroneously applied a heightened pleading standard by requiring that “plus
factors” be expressly alleged for an antitrust conspiracy based on parallel
conduct to survive a motion to dismiss.216 The Second Circuit stated that
the facts alleged in a complaint do “need to include conspiracy among the
realm of plausible possibilities,” but went on to hold, relying on Conley v.
Gibson217 and Nagler v. Admiral,218 that “short of the extremes of ‘bare
bones’ and ‘implausibility,’ a complaint in an antitrust case need only
contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’”219
The Supreme Court reversed,220 sparking a renewed debate in the lower
courts about what a plaintiff must plead to state an antitrust claim. While
the Supreme Court stated that it was not articulating a heightened pleading
standard, and reaffirmed Conley’s requirement that a complaint provide
notice plus grounds for relief, it held that those grounds must be
“plausible.”221 Moreover, although the Second Circuit had not expressly
relied on the Conley holding that a complaint should not be dismissed
“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim,” the Supreme Court stated that the Second Circuit
appeared to have implicitly done so by accepting the plaintiffs’ wholly
conclusory allegations of conspiracy.222 Thus, unlike the Second Circuit,
the Supreme Court concluded that there was no “plausible suggestion of
conspiracy” in the allegations of the Twombly complaint.223
214. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
215. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 102–106 (2d Cir. 2005).
216. Id. at 116.
217. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
218. 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957).
219. Twombly, 425 F.3d at 111 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)).
220. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Although Twombly was an
antitrust case, the pleading standards it set forth apply across the board to all types of cases.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (interpreting the plausibility standard of Twombly
in the context of a federal civil rights action).
221. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
222. Id. at 561. The Supreme Court went on to overrule the “no set of facts” aspect of
Conley, holding that the “phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an
accepted pleading standard.” Id. at 563.
223. Id. at 566.
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The Supreme Court further explained that a complaint in an antitrust
conspiracy case is “plausible” where it provides “enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made,” that is, “enough
fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
illegal agreement.”224 However, exactly what the Supreme Court meant by
“plausible” is not clear. A complaint that contains conclusory, as opposed
to factual, allegations, is not plausible.225 Additionally, allegations that
make the conduct in question merely possible do not meet the plausibility
standard.226 On the other end of the spectrum, plausibility does not demand
that the plaintiff show that the conduct is probable.227 Plausible thus falls
somewhere between possible and probable, but the dividing line is not
clear.228
A. The Second Circuit’s Application of Twombly
The task of clarifying Twombly’s plausibility standard has been left to the
lower courts to develop on a case-by-case basis, and federal courts
throughout the country have since attempted to define what constitutes a
“plausible” claim. Unsurprisingly, the Second Circuit has had its share of
important decisions.
1. In re Elevator Antitrust Litigation
In September 2007, in the first court of appeals decision to apply
Twombly to an antitrust complaint, the Second Circuit in In re Elevator
Antitrust Litigation229 set a higher bar than it previously had for plaintiffs
alleging an antitrust conspiracy. The Second Circuit applied Twombly to
affirm the dismissal of an antitrust complaint regarding an alleged pricefixing scheme among elevator companies.230 In this case, a class of
consumers who purchased elevators and elevator repair and maintenance
services filed a complaint alleging that four major elevator companies
engaged in a conspiracy in the United States and Europe to monopolize the
market.231 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the elevator companies
participated in meetings to discuss pricing and market divisions, agreed to
fix prices, rigged bids for sales and maintenance, exchanged price quotes,
and collusively required customers to enter long-term maintenance
contracts.232
While the Second Circuit wrestled with the Supreme Court’s recent
mandate in Twombly, acknowledging that there is still “considerable

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 555.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 556–67.
502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
Id. at 50.
Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 51.

2016]

ANTITRUST IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT

139

uncertainty”233 as to how broadly it should be applied, it nonetheless
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the complaint’s
conspiracy allegations provided “no plausible grounds to support the
inference of an unlawful agreement.”234 The Second Circuit concluded that
plaintiffs’ allegations were merely conclusory and that they amounted to
“basically every type of conspiratorial activity that one could imagine.”235
Further, the court reasoned that while the alleged parallel conduct was
consistent with a conspiracy, it is “just as much in line with a wide swath of
rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by
common perceptions of the market.”236
2. Starr v. SONY BMG Music Entertainment
Three years later, in Starr v. SONY BMG Music Entertainment,237 the
Second Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of an antitrust challenge
brought by a group of consumers alleging an antitrust conspiracy among
major record labels to fix the prices and terms under which their music
would be sold over the Internet.238 While the district court had dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim under section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ factual allegations placed
the record labels’ parallel conduct “in a context that raises a suggestion of a
preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be
independent action.”239 Unlike the conclusory allegations in the Elevator
case, the specific facts the plaintiffs in Sony alleged included that the prices
charged by defendants’ two music services were unreasonably high—while
their rival charged only $0.25 a song, defendants charged $0.75 a song;
defendants all increased prices in the face of substantially reduced costs;
defendants “controll[ed] over 80 [percent] of [d]igital [m]usic sold to end
purchasers in the United States”;240 defendants used most favored nation
(MFN) clauses in their licenses that effectively guaranteed they would
receive terms no less favorable than those of other licensors, and then tried
to hide the MFNs (including in “secret side letters”) because they knew the
MFNs “would attract antitrust scrutiny”; and one industry commentator
observed that “‘nobody in their right mind’ would want to use” these
services, which suggested to the Second Circuit that “some form of
agreement among defendants would have been needed to render the
enterprises profitable.”241 Based on these allegations, the court held that
the Sony complaint “succeeds where Twombly’s failed because the
complaint alleges specific facts sufficient to plausibly suggest that the

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 50 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007)).
Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
592 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 317.
Id. at 322–24 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
Id. at 323.
Id. at 324.
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parallel conduct alleged was the result of an agreement among the
defendants.”242
Finally, the Second Circuit clarified that—consistent with its preTwombly jurisprudence—when basing a claim on parallel conduct, a
plaintiff is not required to allege facts that tend to exclude independent selfinterested conduct on the part of the defendants, nor does the plaintiff have
to identify the specific time or place or person involved in the conspiracy at
the pleading stage.243 The Second Circuit’s Sony decision thus broadened
and clarified the type of allegations that can constitute a sufficient plausible
factual basis for a Sherman Act section 1 claim under Twombly.
3. Anderson News LLC v. American Media Inc.
In one of the most recent circuit court decisions to shed light on the
Twombly pleading standard, the Second Circuit in 2012 vacated the district
court’s denial of leave to file a proposed amended complaint in Anderson
News L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc.244 There, the plaintiff magazine
wholesaler claimed that a group of magazine publishers and their
distributors violated section 1 by conspiring to drive the plaintiff wholesaler
out of business.245 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant publishers and
distributors colluded to monopolize the “single-copy” (nonsubscription)
magazine sector, of which the plaintiff was the second largest wholesaler in
the United States, by cutting off the plaintiff’s and another wholesaler’s
magazine supply and dividing the wholesale business between two
remaining (nonboycotted) wholesalers.246 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged
that because wholesalers had to bear the cost of handling and returning
unsold magazines (up to 80 percent of magazines shipped), plaintiffs had
implemented a surcharge on all single-copy magazines to be paid by the
publisher defendants.247 In response to that surcharge, the plaintiff alleged
that the publisher defendants and the national distributor defendants had
“cut off 80 [percent] of Anderson’s magazine supply,” “sought to acquire
Anderson’s distribution facilities,” and “poached Anderson’s employees
and their proprietary intellectual property.”248 Plaintiffs further alleged that
defendants, who were otherwise competitors, met numerous times during
the weeks before the boycott and discussed dividing the U.S. distribution
territory into two regions to be controlled by the two remaining
wholesalers.249
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning
that the plaintiff’s allegations of collusion were precluded by its own
242. Id. at 323.
243. Id. at 324–25.
244. 680 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2012).
245. Id. at 167.
246. Id. at 171.
247. Id.
248. Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 389, 395, 397–99 & n.9
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, 680 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2012).
249. Id. at 395.
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conduct in imposing a surcharge, and that the defendants’ refusal to do
business with the plaintiff thereafter could be attributed to the publisher
defendants’ independent business decisions in response to the imposition of
that surcharge.250 The district court therefore held that the plaintiff’s
allegations did not meet Twombly’s plausibility standard, finding that
“[u]nilateral parallel conduct is completely plausible in this context,”251 and
denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and for leave to file an
amended complaint.252
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court erred in ruling
that the allegations in the plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint were
facially implausible under Twombly. Judge Amalya Kearse addressed the
proper application of Twombly: “[A]t the pleading stage, a complaint
claiming conspiracy, to be plausible, must plead ‘enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.’”253 However, the
allegations need not rule out the possibility of independent action. The
Second Circuit distinguished the plaintiff’s allegations in the proposed
amended complaint from the allegations found insufficient in Twombly on
the grounds that the proposed amended complaint alleged that the
defendants “had met or communicated with their competitors and others
and made statements that may plausibly be interpreted as evincing their
agreement to attempt to eliminate Anderson.”254 The court explained that
“[t]he question at the pleading stage is not whether there is a plausible
alternative to the plaintiff’s theory; the question is whether there are
sufficient factual allegations to make the complaint’s claim plausible.”255
The court admonished that “it is not the province of the court to dismiss the
complaint on the basis of the court’s choice among plausible
alternatives.”256 Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the district court
was incorrect in ruling that the plaintiff did not state a plausible claim.257
The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ petition for certiorari,
choosing not to review the Second Circuit’s Twombly analysis.258 This
decision thus has the potential to become an influential decision on pleading
antitrust conspiracies.
B. Other Circuits Have Followed
the Second Circuit’s Application of Twombly
The Second Circuit’s approach in Sony and Anderson News created a
blueprint for other circuits to follow. For example, the Sixth Circuit in Erie

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 398–99.
Id. at 399.
Anderson News, 680 F.3d at 180.
Id. at 184 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 194.
Curtis Circulation Co. v. Anderson News, L.L.C., 133 S. Ct. 846, 847 (2013).
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County v. Morton Salt, Inc.259 affirmed the dismissal of a complaint
alleging price fixing by Ohio salt mine operators.260 It cited the Second
Circuit’s decision in Sony as the only instance in which a circuit court
considered and rejected extending the pleading standard to require plaintiffs
to allege facts that exclude the possibility of lawful, independent
conduct.261 The First Circuit followed the analysis set forth in Anderson
News in its decision in Evergreen Partnering Group, Inc. v. Pactiv Corp.262
There, the court vacated dismissal of a complaint that alleged that food
service packaging manufacturers and two trade associations refused, in
concert, to deal with the plaintiff.263 The First Circuit agreed with the
Second Circuit’s elucidation of Twombly’s plausibility standard, stating that
a complaint must at least allege “the general contours of when an agreement
was made, supporting those allegations with a context that tends to make
said agreement plausible.”264
CONCLUSION
While it has not been possible to cover all of the Second Circuit’s
significant contributions in the area of antitrust law in these pages, the areas
and cases discussed illustrate the Second Circuit’s strong and lasting
influence on the nation’s antitrust jurisprudence. Given the court’s location
at one of the world’s economic centers, and its rich tradition of legal
leadership, there is little doubt that it will continue to do so in the future.

259. 702 F.3d 860 (6th Cir. 2012).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 869.
262. 720 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2013).
263. Id. at 35–36.
264. Id. at 46–47. The impact of Sony and Anderson News extend beyond the antitrust
context. In Vector Capital Corp. v. Ness Technologies, Inc., 511 F. App’x 101 (2d Cir.
2013), the Second Circuit cited Anderson in vacating the district court’s dismissal of
plaintiff’s breach of contract complaint for failure to meet the plausibility standard of
Twombly, finding it sufficient that plaintiff’s allegations allowed for a reasonable inference
of the misconduct alleged. See id. at 104. Likewise, a number of recent district court
decisions applying Anderson News and Sony have allowed plaintiffs’ claims to proceed
regardless of whether alternative, more credible inferences could also be drawn from the
facts alleged. See, e.g., Teixeria v. St. Jude Med., Inc., No. 14-CV-789A, 2015 WL 902616,
at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2015); Ramirez v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
33 F. Supp. 3d 158, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Jimmo v. Sebelius, No. 5:11-CV-17, 2011 WL
5104355, at *22 (D. Vt. Oct. 25, 2011).

